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Ethics of immigration has recently emerged as a topic of great interest 
among political theorists and philosophers. This is not surprising since 
global migration has recently received a good deal of media coverage and 
political attention, due to the great number of refugees and economic mi-
grants attempting to enter western liberal democracies.
One of the central questions in the debate on immigration within politi-
cal theory and philosophy is whether liberal democratic states have a moral 
right to restrict immigration so as to serve their political, cultural and eco-
nomic interests best.
The standard position in mainstream international politics regarding 
this question is based on a widely shared intuition about state autonomy 
regarding external affairs. Sovereign states have a right to choose their 
immigration policy as they see fi t, with some constrains primarily regard-
ing refugees as a specifi cally vulnerable group of migrants. This entitles a 
sovereign state to choose freely whom to accept into their political member-
ship (on what grounds and selection criteria), how to shape their integration 
policy, and impose both on selected immigrants.
This position has since been widely debated and placed under moral 
scrutiny. Political philosophers and thinkers question assumptions under-
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lying the standard position with regard to human right issues, global jus-
tice, equality of opportunity and other recognized liberal and democratic 
values. Joseph Carens, Chandran Kukhatas, Philip Cole, Kieran Oberman 
and many others aim to show that the current international immigration 
regime is deeply unjust, since it often seriously harms interests of prospec-
tive immigrants and sometimes, more troubling, their rights.
David Miller is one of the most prominent liberal thinkers fi rmly posi-
tioned on ‘the right to exclude’ side of the immigration debate. Strangers in 
Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration summarizes and fur-
ther develops Miller’s previous work in political philosophy with regard to 
complex issues of immigration.
This book, although rather concise, covers a wide range of important 
questions in philosophy of immigration: from human rights, cosmopolitan-
ism and global justice, legitimacy and self-determination of states, cultural 
identity of citizens and social justice, to the moral difference between vari-
ous types of immigrants regarding their rights and obligations, status and 
citizenship acquisition.
The book is divided into nine chapters. The fi rst four give outlines of 
a broader discussion regarding human rights, cosmopolitanism, compa-
triotism, and the open borders debate, establishing a philosophical basis 
for further developing of the author`s position. Following the more general 
introductory chapters, Miller is dedicated to more specifi c topics, such as 
the moral difference between refugees and economic migrants, taking into 
account the debates regarding their rights and integration once accepted 
into society. In the second part of the book, chapters seven and eight re-
spectively, Miller offers some policy recommendations stemming from the 
account he develops. The conclusion provides a brief overview of his position 
with some commentary on methodology.
An important feature of Miller`s account is his commitment to realism. 
Instead of venturing into ideal normative theory, which barely relies on cur-
rent empirical evidence, Miller grounds his book on a realistic premise. Im-
migration regimes are under stress, there is a great number of immigrants 
seeking admission, and citizens’ sentiments towards their inclusion are am-
biguous and increasingly full of resentment and prejudice (159). “What is 
needed is clear policy on immigration that can be set out and defended pub-
licly” (160), Miller stresses. Throughout this book, Miller is trying to show 
that states have a general right to shape their immigration policies freely, 
which includes the right to restrict immigration, with constrains defi ned 
with reference to human rights and values of social justice. 
Miller`s position, described by the author himself as “communitarian” and 
“social democratic” (161), is based on four main values (153): a weak moral 
cosmopolitanism, national self-determination, fairness and social integra-
tion. Each is connected to the topics that Miller tackles throughout the book.
In his discussion regarding cosmopolitanism, Miller is primarily inter-
ested in a moral standpoint that establishes equal moral worth of all hu-
man beings. This axiom, as it is commonly stated, means simply “that it 
is unacceptable to respect and treat people differently simply by virtue of 
some (morally irrelevant) feature such as their gender or skin color” (22), or 
relevantly for further discussion, their nationality or cultural affi liations.
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Weak moral cosmopolitanism, which Miller endorses, relaxes some 
counter-intuitive implications of the stronger version while appealing to the 
same value of equal moral worth of all people. According to strong cosmopol-
itanism, duties we owe to other human beings are the same “regardless of 
the relationship in which we stand toward them” (22).  Pure impartiality in 
our dealings with other human beings, regardless of any familial, national, 
civic or emotional ties—that strong cosmopolitanism requires—boils down 
in the weaker version to a more robust consideration for human rights, leav-
ing space for partiality in relationships that give meaning to human life, 
like family, friends and for Miller, especially signifi cant, compatriots and 
co-nationals.
In the discussion on moral cosmopolitanism, Miller builds a case for 
compatriot partiality (21) in external politics of nation states, which in-
cludes relevant immigration policies concerning admission, and afterwards, 
integration.
What weak cosmopolitanism entails is that states should consider the 
impact of their policies on people outside their borders, including those who 
wish to enter, thus granting them equal consideration and respect as fellow 
human beings (22–24). It “tells us nothing about how much weight should 
be attached to the interests of different groups of people […] affected by a 
state`s policy, other than that some reason must be given if they are going 
to be assigned unequal weights” (24).
In our interaction with immigrants, Miller states, we should take their 
interest and moral standing seriously, choosing policies that protect their 
basic human rights. Taking interests of immigrants seriously, for Miller, 
amounts to carefully considering their requests, such as becoming a mem-
ber of our political community, and giving good reasons to them in case of 
refusal.
States are thus justifi ed in the differential treatment of their citizens 
and immigrants, so long as human rights of all are adequately protected. 
Differential treatment is justifi ed by virtue of the nature of relationships in 
which we stand to others (26). Special, associative obligations that states 
have towards their citizens arise due to economic, political and cultural re-
lationships within the political and national community, which prospective 
immigrants are not (yet) part of. Members of a political community par-
ticipate together in the economy, the division of labour, legal and political 
schemes; they relate to one another as citizens, share a similar set of cul-
tural values and a sense of belonging to the distinct community that exists 
through common history (26).  For these reasons, when minimally decent 
life is guaranteed to all, we cannot expect liberal democracies to set aside 
special considerations they have towards their citizens in the attempt to 
accommodate all claims of prospective immigrants. However, what can be 
expected of states is to treat prospective immigrants with due respect and 
consideration when their claims, as serious as membership in a political 
community, are assessed.
The second value that informs Miller’s position regarding immigra-
tion is national self-determination (154). It assumes, according to Miller, 
a group, the self, with a range of values and goals that members recognize 
as part of their identity (69).  For states to be fully self-determining, their 
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citizens should have a say in shaping the future of their community, accord-
ing to goals and values recognized as collective. This includes shaping their 
immigrant policies—whom to accept into the community, when, and under 
what conditions—since immigration has a profound effect on the political, 
economic and cultural shape of the community.  Self-determination entails 
“right of a democratic public to make a wide range of policy choices within 
the limits set by human rights.” (62)
The right to control immigration is important for various reasons and 
Miller points out several, such as cultural identity, control over policies, 
population size, social trust and the functioning of democracy. He also ad-
dresses some objections to his position.
The value of national self-determination, for Miller, is to be supplement-
ed with the idea of territorial jurisdiction, “that implies the right to control 
the movement of people in and out of that territory” (58).
Appealing to the value of national and cultural identity, and territorial 
rights, sets Miller apart from other positions in the immigration debate 
that are mostly based on the value of self-determination. For example, C. 
H. Wellman`s position is based on the right to freedom of association as an 
integral part of self-determination of a community.
The discussion on social justice and social practices that Miller brings up 
when assessing the rights of immigrants and their integration into society, 
is guided by the value of fairness (155). Fairness requires balance and reci-
procity in generating social practices, and adequate distribution of burdens 
and benefi ts between participants in society. “Balance has to be struck be-
tween the claims that immigrants can rightfully make and the responsibili-
ties they can reasonably be expected to assume.” (155)
According to Miller, issues of social justice are set apart from human 
rights issues (116). For a state to be legitimate, it is obligatory to provide 
protection of basic human rights to everyone present in the state, regard-
less of their citizenship status. On the other hand, rights of social justice are 
wider, in the sense that they provide benefi ts, resources and opportunities 
that go beyond providing a “minimally decent life”, which human rights are 
designated to protect. For Miller, an adequate immigration policy should 
be based on reciprocity between the recipient state and the immigrant. Im-
migrants should be treated fairly, but should also be expected to contribute 
to the host society and uphold its laws and norms (127). Fairness is con-
stitutive to the notion of citizenship, since the inclusion of legally present 
long-term immigrants as full political members of society is a prerequisite 
for upholding liberal and democratic values. Forming a permanent caste of 
denizens is not in line with the values of a socially just society. This is in 
line with other prominent thinkers dealing with immigration (e.g. M. Wal-
zer and J. Carens).
Miller applies the notion of fairness to distinguish various types of im-
migrants. Long term immigrants and temporary immigrants have different 
sets of rights, obligations and expectations. Treating them fairly, accord-
ing to Miller, also means respecting designated policies and schemes set 
with regard to these differences; refugees and irregular immigrants acquire 
different sets of obligations and policies due to urgency of human rights 
protection, or irregularity of their presence in the host society. For that 
 Book Reviews 389
reason, Miller dedicates a more detailed discussion to these types of im-
migrants—along with their claims, rights and obligations—in relation to 
their host states.
Finally, closely connected to national self-determination and fairness is 
the idea of integrated society (156). Integration of immigrants into society 
is essential to forming social relationships between people from different 
cultural, religious and ethnic backgrounds based on mutual trust, equality 
and reciprocity. Three different types of integration are acknowledged, with 
cultural integration being the most controversial. Social integration encom-
passes participation in social practices, institutions and associations with 
special emphasis on the way members of different groups interact with each 
other (132). Civic integration, on the other hand, amounts to full participa-
tion in political life of the community, which includes understanding the 
goals of the community, together with norms and principles that guide po-
litical and social life (133). Fostering social and political integration leads to 
a confl ict-free society guided by values of equal access to social services for 
all permanently residing in the state (134). Cultural integration is rather 
contestable. It is not, as civic integration is, a requirement, and it can only 
be an aspiration (149). Critics usually consider it both oppressive and un-
necessary (141). Miller is still inclined to consider it as useful aspiration for 
society that wants to be confl ict-free and socially just, since cultural integra-
tion means full understanding and acceptance of the public culture, while 
at the same time it leaves space for accommodating aspects of migrant cul-
tures. If social, political and cultural integration is an expectation that the 
host society has, with regard to immigrants that wish to permanently be-
come part of the society, then what reciprocity requires is equal inclusion of 
immigrants in economic, political and social life, with all the benefi ts that 
it presupposes (150).
Miller gives an overview of pro-open borders arguments that are com-
patible with weak moral cosmopolitanism, i.e. arguments from 1) common 
ownership of the Earth (H. Grotius, I. Kant, M. Risse), 2) global equality of 
opportunity (J. Carens) and 3) the human right to immigrate (K. Oberman). 
The purpose of this part of the book, together with the chapter on closed 
borders, is to show that open borders position can be rejected and that a 
case for the state’s right to restrict immigration can be built and defended. 
Open-borders arguments are critically assessed and ultimately rejected, 
with special concern given to arguments based on the human right to im-
migrate. A special consideration is dedicated to this specifi c pro-open border 
defence strategy, since, without its rejection, Miller`s argument would lose 
its footing.  If it were shown that there is a genuine right to immigrate, 
restricting immigration with appeal to social justice, cultural and national 
identity and self-determination would not be possible (162). Human right to 
immigrate would trump these considerations. 
Miller recognizes the three strategies used for justifying the human 
right to immigrate, which, in a strict sense, is defi ned as a negative right 
not to be prevented from entering and settling in any state (49). These 
strategies are as follows: 1) direct strategy, 2) instrumental strategy and 
3) cantilever strategy. The direct strategy aims to show that the right to 
immigrate has the same grounds as other human rights. What needs to be 
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shown is that having such a right enables people to live decent lives (50). 
When discussing the right to immigrate, it is argued that it allows people to 
enjoy a wide spectrum of life options that are not all available in their home 
country. For Miller, particular preferences and interests, such as career op-
portunities, relationships or cultural preferences, satisfi ed only by moving 
to another country, cannot justify the general human right to immigrate. 
If states are legitimate, and they protect human rights of its citizens and 
offer an adequate range of life options important for a decent human life 
within their borders, then there is no basis for establishing a general right 
to immigrate that would enable other life options elsewhere. Refugees are 
a clear example of people whose life options are severely reduced and their 
human rights limited, which is exactly what gives strength to their claim 
to immigrate. It is important to note that Miller defends a minimal concep-
tion of human rights. Their function is to protect basic human needs and 
interests and to ensure a minimally decent life. Miller emphasises “that the 
purpose of human rights is to identify a threshold that must not be crossed 
rather than to describe a social ideal” (33). This conception of human rights 
is less demanding than positions that ground human rights in human au-
tonomy, and also see them as positive rights that facilitate the fulfi lment of 
autonomous human life. Thus our particular interest in options outside of 
our country, when an adequate range of other options are available, is not 
powerful enough to ground the right to immigrate as a human right.
Instrumental arguments try to show that the right to immigrate is 
needed as protection of other rights and freedoms (52). Miller specifi cally 
stresses the right to exit as recognized in international human rights docu-
ments (i.e. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948), which is, howev-
er, not matched by a corresponding general right to immigrate. For Miller, 
the reasons are obvious: we do not need a general right to immigrate for 
the right to exit to be meaningful. It suffi ces that one country is willing to 
allow us to immigrate, and that this can be fulfi lled by, for example, bilat-
eral agreements (52).  What is needed is an adequate level of protection for 
other rights and freedoms, and for that, Miller stresses, an unlimited right 
to immigrate is not needed. Instrumental arguments open other important 
questions, and Miller tackles the so called ‘brain-drain’ issue; the cost of 
out-migration of professionals from poor countries, that results in the lack 
of basic services, such as health service, are borne by the most vulnerable 
and poor that are not even able to emigrate (53). He concludes, “taking 
everyone`s human rights into account, recognizing a human right to im-
migrate does not provide optimal protection for other human rights if one of 
its effects is to encourage more brain drain from poor states” (53). However, 
one should note that brain drain is a complex matter, with multidimen-
sional effects on poor states. Using it as philosophical argumentation in the 
immigration debate, without taking into account complex data from social 
sciences, can be problematic, as Kieran Oberman points out shrewdly in his 
article ‘Poverty and Immigration policy’. 
The third and fi nal strategy for defending the notion of the human right 
to immigrate is the so-called cantilever strategy. It begins from the notion 
of the human right to freedom of movement within each state. The right 
to freedom of movement (or immigration) beyond borders is considered to 
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be the logical extension of the right to freedom of movement within state 
borders (53). Joseph Carens advocates this strategy in his book The Eth-
ics of Immigration (2013). The reasons for which liberal democracies treat 
freedom of movement within each state as a general human right are same 
in the case of movement between states. Opponents of the cantilever argu-
ment either have to bite the bullet and concede that there are no violations 
of rights if people are prevented to move from one region or state to another, 
both of which provide an adequate range of options, or explain how border 
control is compatible with the mentioned right (54). Miller gives reasons for 
destabilizing the analogy between cross-border movement and movement 
within a state. First, unrestricted freedom of movement is costly. In the 
domestic case, this is manageable, but on the international scale costs and 
stakes can be higher, leaving states without mechanisms to protect their 
citizens. Secondly, the right to freedom of movement in the domestic case 
prevents the state from dominating minorities, by, for example, resettle-
ments or segregation. Human rights of such groups outside a particular 
country are not endangered in this way by restricting immigration. 
With the open borders positions refuted, and values of national self-
determination supplemented with the idea of territorial jurisdiction and 
the weak cosmopolitanism premise put in place, Miller concludes that it 
can be shown that states have a right to restrict immigration. The right to 
close its borders is not coercive, Miller stresses, but preventative, giving 
regard to self-determination, population control and a proper functioning of 
democracy. States, however, have responsibilities towards different types 
of prospective immigrants in admission, and later, for those accepted, in 
their integration. As noted earlier, these responsibilities are to be guided by 
values of weak moral cosmopolitanism, fairness, and an integrated society. 
A large part of the book is dedicated to untangling sets of responsibilities 
states owe to different types of immigrants. For refugees, these are more 
extensive and urgent, while for economic migrants, the relationship is of 
mutual benefi t. One group of potential immigrants is singled out, and Mill-
er calls them particularity claimants (77). Their claims are “held against 
one particular state” (77), in virtue of previous events, such as service to 
the state, or some past injustice suffered by the hand of a particular state. 
The difference between these is that refugees and economic migrants can 
hold claims against any state, while particularity claimants have a special 
relationship with one state against which they hold a claim for admission, 
for example as a form of reparation.
These and many other questions regarding immigration are raised in 
this book. The discussion is based on Miller`s previous work on social jus-
tice, nationality, global justice and responsibility. His account is informed 
by important work from other political theorists and philosophers that deal 
with immigration. However, a more extensive book format would be needed 
to provide space for a more detailed discussion, with opponents and phi-
losophers of similar accounts—not to mention extensive research of social 
scientists concerning various aspects of immigration.
Miller does not give his readers a simple recipe for ideal immigration 
policy. What this book provides are outlines of immigration policy that 
should be based on four values mentioned earlier. A precise shape of policy 
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should be developed by each country, in line with other goals (160), values 
and interests that their communities cherish. Questions raised in this book 
are not easy, as Miller aimed to show, and faced with crises such as the one 
in Europe in 2015, scientists, politicians and theorists will be faced with a 
daring task of answering them. 
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